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Notes
THE SUPREME COURT'S LATEST RESOLUTION OF THE
CONFLICT BETWEEN FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS:
BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V DALE AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS IN AND OUT OF THE COURTROOM
I. INTRODUCTION
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,1 the United States Supreme Court en-
ded the legal battle between James Dale, an openly gay Assistant Scoutmas-
ter, and the Boy Scouts of America. 2 Dale was also the Court's latest effort
to reconcile the conflict between a private organization's freedom to asso-
ciate and a state's attempt to eradicate discrimination through a public
accommodations law.3 The Court held in Dale that New Jersey's Law
Against Discrimination which forced the Boy Scouts to admit James Dale
violated the Boy Scouts' freedom of expressive association. In doing so,
the Court allowed freedom of expression to be used as a successful de-
fense to a state's public accommodations law.4 Reading Dale narrowly, the
result of the case is definite: the Boy Scouts do have a right to exclude
homosexuals. 5 This Note contends, however, that the broad impact of
Dale is yet to be seen both on the Court's approach to the freedom of
expressive association and on the specific groups involved in Dale, the Boy
Scouts of America and homosexuals. 6
Part II of this Note provides a brief background of the two conflicting
legal issues in Dale, a private group's First Amendment right to freedom of
association and the states' attempts to eliminate discrimination through
1. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
2. See generally Dale, 530 U.S. at 661 (holding that forcing Boy Scouts to admit
James Dale and other homosexuals through state antidiscrimination law violates
First Amendment freedom of expressive association). For a further discussion of
the facts and holding of Dale, see infra notes 53-113 and accompanying text.
3. For a further discussion of the conflict between freedom of association and
state public accommodations laws, see infra notes 12-52 and accompanying text.
4. For a further discussion of the facts of Dale and the majority's holding and
reasoning, see infra notes 53-113 and accompanying text.
5. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 644 (holding that applying New Jersey's pubic accom-
modations law to force Boy Scouts of America to admit James Dale as gay Scout-
master violates Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association).
6. For a further discussion of the aftermath of Dale, see infra notes 133-90 and
accompanying text.
(387)
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modern public accommodations laws. 7 Part III analyzes the reasoning of
the majority and dissenting opinions in Dale by examining the Court's ap-
plication of precedent in this area.8 Finally, Part IV looks at Dale's after-
math, specifically focusing on Dale's possible impact on the Boy Scouts of
America, homosexual individuals and gay rights advocacy groups.9
II. BACKGROUND
Dale was not the first time that the United States Supreme Court faced
a conflict between a private organization's right to freedom of expressive
association and a state public accommodations law.10 Before discussing
Dale, this Note will therefore briefly explain these two conflicting aspects
of the law and the method the Court has prescribed to deal with this
conflict.1 '
A. Freedom of Association
Although the word "associate" does not appear anywhere in the text
of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court recognized long ago in
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson12 that "[i]t is beyond debate that free-
dom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is
an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech."' 3 The
7. For a further discussion of the First Amendment rights to freedom of inti-
mate and expressive association and the Court's resolution of its conflict with mod-
ern public accommodations laws, see infra notes 12-52 and accompanying text.
8. For a further discussion and analysis of the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Dale, see infra notes 79-132 and accompanying text.
9. For a further discussion of the impact that Dale may have on the Boy Scouts
of America, homosexual individuals and gay rights advocacy groups, see infra notes
138-90 and accompanying text.
10. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,
515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995) (holding that applying Massachusetts' law to require or-
ganizers of private parade to admit group expressing view not of private organiza-
tion's choosing violated First Amendment); N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. New York City,
487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988) (declaring invalid facial challenge of local New York City law
forbidding discrimination by certain private clubs); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (holding that applying Unruh Act
to force California Rotary Clubs to admit women did not violate First Amendment
right to freedom of expressive association); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 612 (1984) (holding that applying Minnesota Human Rights Act to force
private organization to admit female members did not infringe on private organi-
zation's freedom of expressive association). Roberts, Duarte and New York State Club
have been referred to as "a public accommodations versus expressive association
trilogy." David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66 Mo.
L. REv. 83, 100 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws].
11. For a further discussion of the conflict between freedom of association
and public accommodations laws, see infra notes 12-52 and accompanying text.
12. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
13. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460. Scholars recognize Patterson as the first case to
explicitly recognize the right of expressive association. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein,
The Right of Expressive Association and Private Universities' Racial Preferences and Speech
[Vol. 47: p. 387
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Court views this right to a generally protected "'freedom of association' in
two distinct senses": first, the right to "freedom of intimate association" and
second, the right to "freedom of expressive association."
14
Under the right to intimate association, the Court has concluded that
"[i]n this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a funda-
mental element of personal liberty." 15 This right to intimate association
covers a limited number of relationships including marriage, raising chil-
dren and living with one's relatives. 16 Under freedom of expressive associ-
ation, the Court has stated that "[t] he Constitution guarantees freedom of
association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other indi-
vidual liberties." 17 The "other individual liberties" are those activities pro-
tected by the First Amendment, including "speech, assembly, petition for
the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion." 18
In each case, the level of constitutional protection given to freedom
of association will depend on whether intimate or expressive association is
implicated. 19 The factors to be considered in determining whether a par-
ticular relationship is considered "intimate" or "expressive" include "size,
purpose, policies, selectivity [and] congeniality .... -20
Codes, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 619, 620 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Expressive
Association] (stating that "the Supreme Court first explicitly recognized the right of
expressive association in protecting the NAACP against harassment by southern
state governments"). The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law
respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The Court has further recognized that "as is true of
all expressions of First Amendment freedoms, the courts may not interfere on the
ground that they view a particular expression as unwise or irrational." Democratic
Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 124 (1981).
14. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 618. In giving the freedom of intimate association such a high de-
gree of constitutional protection, the Court has concluded that "choices to enter
into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against
undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguard-
ing the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme." Id. at 617-
18.
16. See id. at 619 (listing examples of certain relationships that "exemplify
these considerations, and . . .suggest some relevant limitations on the relation-
ships that might be entitled to this sort of constitutional protection").
17. Id. at 618.
18. Id.
19. See id. (explaining that "the nature and degree of constitutional protec-
tion afforded freedom of association may vary depending on the extent to which
one or the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is at stake in a
given case").
20. Id. at 620.
3
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B. Public Accommodations Laws
Contemporary public accommodations or antidiscrimination laws are
rooted in the common law.2 1 The common law prohibited public employ-
ees from refusing to serve a customer without good reason. 22 The com-
mon law prohibition, however, was too general and proved to be
insufficient in many situations. 23
To counter this insufficiency, most states passed detailed antidis-
crimination statutes that expanded upon the common law duty not to dis-
criminate.24 These modern forms of statutory protection follow a
consistent pattern.2 5 First, the statutes enumerate the persons or entities
subject to the prohibition against discrimination. 26 In doing so, these lists
expand on the persons and entities that were subject to the common law
prohibition. 27 Second, the laws also depart from, and further expand
upon, the common law by enumerating the groups or persons within the
law's protection. 28 These enumerated lists are "the essential device[s]
21. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996) (discussing general common
law prohibition against discrimination).
22. See id. ("At common law, innkeepers, smiths, and others who 'made pro-
fession of a public employment,' were prohibited from refusing, without good rea-
son, to serve a customer.") (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian &
Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 571 (1995)).
As one of the 19th-century judges put it, the rule was that "the innkeeper
is not to select his guests[;] he has no right to say to one, you shall come
into my inn, and to another you shall not, as every one coming and con-
ducting himself in a proper manner has a right to be received; and for
this purpose innkeepers are a sort of public servants."
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 571 (quoting Rex v. Ivens, 7 Car. & P. 213, 219, 173 Eng. Rep.
94, 96 (N.P. 1835) (alteration in original)).
23. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 627-28 (explaining that common law rule was gen-
eral and did not specify protection for particular groups).
24. See id. at 628 (noting that states chose to pass detailed statutory schemes
because Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress power to eliminate dis-
crimination in public places).
25. See id. (citing public accommodations laws in Denver and Boulder, Colo-
rado, as examples of this consistent pattern). For a further discussion of New
Jersey's version of these statutes, see infra notes 68, 70 and accompanying text.
26. See id. ("The laws first enumerate the persons or entities subject to a duty
not to discriminate.").
27. See id. ("The list goes well beyond the entities covered by the common
law.").
28. See id. (explaining that "[t]hese statutes and ordinances also depart from
the common law by enumerating the groups or persons within their ambit of pro-
tection"). According to one scholar:
Federal antidiscrimination laws have expanded over the decades from the
original focus on race, with lesser focuses on religion and sex, to include
bans on discrimination on the basis of age, disability, pregnancy, marital
status, and veteran's status. In state and local jurisdictions, antidiscrimina-
tion laws cover everything from sexual preference to political ideology to
weight to appearance, to, incredibly, membership in a motorcycle gang.
David E. Bernstein, Sex Discrimination Laws Versus Civil Liberties, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 133, 169 [hereinafter Bernstein, Sex Discrimination] (emphasis added). The stat-
utes "have expanded beyond those groups that have been given heightened equal
390 [Vol. 47: p. 387
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss2/3
2002] NOTE
used to make the duty not to discriminate concrete and provide guidance
for those who must comply" with the statutes.
29
C. The Inevitable Conflict
By ensuring access to a broad range of goods and services to an
equally expansive list of individuals, public accommodations laws inevita-
bly conflict with the First Amendment rights of proprietors, or groups, to
decide with whom they will associate. 30 Furthermore, many Americans be-
lieve in two conflicting principles underlying the conflict between free-
dom of association and public accommodations laws. 31 First, that the
government should not infringe upon civil liberties such as freedom of
association.3 2 Second, that the government, however, must protect cer-
tain groups from discrimination.
33
The leading case on the conflict between the First Amendment right
to freedom of association and public accommodations laws is Roberts v.
United States Jaycees.3 4 Specifically, Roberts presented a general approach
for courts to follow when addressing this conflict.3 5 At issue in Roberts
were the membership policies of the United States Jaycees, a non-profit
protection scrutiny" by the Court. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 n.2
(2000). "Some municipal ordinances have even expanded to cover criteria such as
prior criminal record, prior psychiatric treatment, military status, personal appear-
ance, source of income, place of residence, and political ideology." Id.
29. Romer, 517 U.S. at 628.
30. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion, Homo-
sexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J.
2411, 2415 (1997) ("With the advent of vigorous antidiscrimination laws that inci-
dentally restrict expression, the collision of nomic communities is today often ac-
companied by a collision of constitutional commitments, between the liberty of
one group to exclude and express its disapproval, and the desire of an excluded
group for equal treatment."); Nancy J. Knauer, "Simply So Different". The Uniquely
Expressive Character of the Openly Gay Individual After Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,
89 Ky. L.J. 997, 1010 (2000) ("The reach of [public accommodations] laws.., is
potentially limited by the First Amendment rights of the employer, landlord,
merchant, or organization in question."); Lauren J. Rosenblum, Note, Equal Access
or Free Speech: The Constitutionality of Public Accommodations Laws, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1243, 1243-44 (1997) (explaining that purpose of statutes is to ensure equal access
to goods and services and that, in creating right of equal access, statutes inevitably
conflict with First Amendment right of proprietors to select those with which they
choose to speak and/or associate).
31. See Bernstein, Sex Discrimination, supra note 28, at 133 (discussing princi-
ples and explaining that they are "ultimately conflicting").
32. See id. (noting that "many Americans believe that freedom of speech, free-
dom of association, and freedom of religion must be protected from infringement
by the government... ").
33. See id. (explaining that many Americans also believe that government
must "intervene in civil society in order to eliminate discrimination against a wide
variety of protected groups .
34. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
35. Cf Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws, supra note 10, at 91 ("Roberts quickly
became the leading precedent in cases where constitutional defenses were asserted
against the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws.").
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organization that limited its regular membership status to men between
the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. 36 The national organization of the
Jaycees sanctioned two local chapters after they began admitting women as
regular members. 37 In response, the chapters filed charges of discrimina-
tion against the national organization alleging that excluding women from
full membership violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act.38
In addressing whether applying the Minnesota Human Rights Act to
force the Jaycees to admit women infringed upon the Jaycees' freedom of
association, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, considered sepa-
rately the effect of the Minnesota Human Rights Act on both the Jaycees'
freedom of intimate and expressive association. 9 In regards to intimate
association, Justice Brennan observed that the local chapters at issue
lacked the characteristics that would afford constitutional protection to
the Jaycees' decision to exclude women. 40 After concluding that the ap-
36. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614 (describing membership policies of United
States Jaycees). Women were allowed only to obtain the status of an associate
member. See id. (explaining that "associate membership [was] available to individ-
uals or groups ineligible for, regular membership, principally women and older
men"). Associate members paid lower dues than regular members but were una-
ble to "vote, hold local or national office, or participate in certain leadership train-
ing and awards programs." Id.
37. See id. (explaining that national organization imposed sanctions on St.
Paul and Minneapolis chapters including denying chapters' members eligibility for
awards and refusing to count their votes at national conventions).
38. See id. (stating that chapters filed charges of discrimination complaining
that national organization's bylaws forbidding full membership to women violated
Minnesota Human Rights Act). The pertinent part of the Minnesota Human
Rights Act quoted by the Court reads: "'It is an unfair discriminatory practice: To
deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation
because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex."' Id. at
614-15 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 3 (1982)). Furthermore, the term
"'place of public accommodation' is defined in the Act as 'a business, accommoda-
tion, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind,
whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or
accommodations are extended, offered, sold or otherwise made available to the
public."' Id. at 615 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 18 (1982)).
39. See id. at 618 (explaining that Court would "consider separately the effect
of applying the Minnesota statute to the Jaycees on... its members' freedom of
intimate association and their freedom of expressive association").
40. See id. at 621 ("The undisputed facts reveal that the local chapters of the
Jaycees are large and basically unselective groups."). Specifically, Justice Brennan
observed that both the national organization and the local chapters recruited
members and admitted them without inquiring into their backgrounds. See id.
(finding that "neither the national organization nor the local chapters employ[ed]
any criteria for judging applicants for membership" and that "new members
[were] routinely recruited and admitted with no inquiry into their backgrounds").
Justice Brennan referred to the testimony of a local officer who stated that "he
could recall no instance in which an applicant had been denied membership on
any basis other than age or sex." Id. Earlier in his opinion, regarding the Jaycees'
right to protection based on intimate association, Justice Brennan determined that
"1several features of the Jaycees clearly place the organization outside of the cate-
gory of relationships worthy of this kind of constitutional protection." Id. at 620.
392 [Vol. 47: p. 387
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plication of the Minnesota statute did not violate the Jaycees' members'
right to freedom of intimate association, Justice Brennan addressed
whether the application of the statute to theJaycees' members violated the
organization's freedom of expressive association. 4 1 After examining the
activities and functions of theJaycees,Justice Brennan determined that "in
view of the various protected activities" that the Jaycees engaged in, the
organization's right to expressive association was "plainly implicated. 42
Justice Brennan stated, however, that the right to expressive associa-
tion is not absolute. 4 3 Specifically, Justice Brennan acknowledged that in-
fringements on this right can be justified by "regulations adopted to serve
compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that can-
not be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms." 44 Applying this compelling interest test to the Minnesota
Human Rights Act, Justice Brennan determined that "Minnesota's compel-
ling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens justi-
fies the impact that application of the statute to the Jaycees may have on
the male members' associational freedoms."45 Finally, Justice Brennan
concluded that "even if enforcement of the Act cause [d] some incidental
abridgement of the Jaycees' protected speech, that effect [was] no greater
than [was] necessary to accomplish the State's legitimate purposes. '46
41. See id. at 621-22 (turning to consider whether applying Minnesota Act in-
fringes group's freedom of expressive association). Justice Brennan also explained
the significance of the right to expressive association. See id. at 622 (recognizing
that "implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment
[is] a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends").
42. Id. Among the constitutionally protected activities that theJaycees and its
members engaged in were taking "public positions on a number of diverse issues"
and "engag[ing] in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, [and] fundraising" activ-
ities. Id. at 626-27.
43. See id. at 623 (finding that right to expressive association is not absolute).
44. Id.
45. Id. Discussing the Act on its face, Justice Brennan noted that it did "not
aim at the suppression of speech, [did] not distinguish between prohibited and
permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint, and [did] not license enforcement
authorities to administer the statute on the basis of such constitutionally impermis-
sible criteria." Id. Justice Brennan further noted that "the Act reflect[ed] the
State's strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its
citizens equal access to publicly available goods and services." Id. at 624. Discuss-
ing the application of the Act to the Jaycees, Justice Brennan concluded that Min-
nesota had advanced its interests "in the least restrictive means of achieving those
ends." Id. at 626. More specifically, Justice Brennan commented that there was no
reason to believe that the application of the Act to the Jaycees would "impede the
organization's ability to engage in . . . protected activities or to disseminate its
preferred views." Id. at 627. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Brennan ex-
plained that "the Act require[d] no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting
interests of young men, and it impos[ed] no restrictions on the organization's abil-
ity to exclude individuals with ideologies or philosophies different from those of its
existing members." Id.
46. Id. at 628.
2002] NOTE 393
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Three years later in Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary
Club of Duarte,47 the Court addressed both a factual and legal issue almost
identical to that in Roberts.4 8 Writing for the majority and looking to fac-
tors similar to Roberts, Justice Powell concluded that Rotary Clubs were not
entitled to the constitutional protection afforded to intimate association.49
Turning then to Rotary Club's freedom of expressive association, Justice
Powell emphasized that "the evidence fail [ed] to demonstrate that admit-
ting women to Rotary Clubs [would] affect in any significant way the ex-
isting members' ability to carry out their various purposes."50 Following
Justice Brennan's opinion in Roberts, Justice Powell found that the state
had a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against women
and the Act at issue plainly served that interest.51 Therefore, he con-
cluded that "the application of the ... Act to California Rotary Clubs [did]
not violate the right of expressive association." 52
III. Boy ScouTs OF AMERICA V. DALE: THE SUPREME COURT'S
RESOLUTION OF THE LATEST CONFLIcT
A. Facts and Procedural History
James Dale's affiliation with the Boy Scouts of America began in 1978
when, at the age of eight, he joined the Monmouth Council's Cub Scout
Pack 142. 5 3 In 1981, Dale became a Boy Scout and remained so until he
was eighteen. 54 Dale was an exemplary Scout and in 1988 he became an
Eagle Scout, one of the highest honors a member can receive. 5 5 In 1989,
Dale applied for an adult membership in the Boy Scouts. 56 The Boy
Scouts approved his application for adult membership and he became an
47. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
48. See Rotary, 481 U.S. at 539 (framing issue as "whether a California statute
that requires California Rotary Clubs to admit women members violates the First
Amendment").
49. See id. at 547 (concluding that Act in question did not interfere with right
to private association).
50. Id. at 548.
51. See id. at 549 (referring to recognition in Roberts of State's compelling in-
terest to eradicate discrimination against women).
52. Id.
53. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (stating back-
ground facts of case).
54. See id. (stating duration of Dale's status as Boy Scout).
55. See id. (noting Dale's accomplishments as member of Boy Scouts). James
Dale also "earned 25 merit badges [and] was admitted into the prestigious Order
of the Arrow." Id. at 665 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Scouts award the rank of
Eagle Scout to only three percent of its members. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting Dale's accomplishments as member of Boy Scouts).
56. See id. at 644 (explaining background of Dale's adult membership in Boy
Scouts).
[Vol. 47: p. 387
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss2/3
2002] NOTE
Assistant Scoutmaster.57 Around the same time, Dale began attending
Rutgers University.5
8
After he arrived at Rutgers, Dale, for the first time, acknowledged to
himself and others, that he was gay. 59 Dale also became involved in the
Rutgers Lesbian/Gay Alliance, of which he later became co-president.
60
In 1990, Dale attended a seminar that addressed the psychological and
health needs of lesbian and gay teenagers.61 A newspaper covering the
event interviewed Dale regarding his advocacy of role models for gay and
lesbian teenagers. 62 The newspaper later published the interview, along
with a picture of Dale and a caption identifying him as the co-president of
the Rutgers Lesbian/Gay Alliance.6 3 Within the same month that the arti-
cle was published, Dale received a letter from the Monmouth Council re-
voking his adult membership.
6 4
By letter, Dale requested the reason for the revocation of his member-
ship.65 Dale was informed that the Boy Scouts "'specifically forbid mem-
57. See id. (stating background facts of case).
58. See id. (stating background facts of case).
59. See id. at 644-45 (explaining Dale's open acknowledgment of his
homosexuality).
60. See id. at 645 (describing Dale's membership and status in Rutgers Les-
bian/Gay Alliance).
61. See id. (stating background facts of case).
62. See id. (stating background facts of case).
63. See id. (explaining that published newspaper article identified Dale as
president of Rutgers' Lesbian/Gay Alliance). The relevant part of the passage/
interview reads:
'James Dale, 19, co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian Gay Alli-
ance ..., said
he lived a double life while in high school, pretending to be straight while
attending a
military academy.
"He remembers dating girls and even laughing at homophobic jokes
while at school, only admitting his homosexuality during his second year
at Rutgers.
"'I was looking for a role model, someone who was gay and accepting of
me,' Dale said, adding he wasn't just seeking sexual experiences, but a
community that would take him in and provide him with a support net-
work and friends."
Id. at 689-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 645 (stating that Dale received letter from Monmouth Council
Executive, James Kay, revoking his adult membership). "The letter stated that
membership in BSA 'is a privilege' that may be denied 'whenever there is a con-
cern that an individual may not meet the high standards of membership which the
BSA seeks to provide for American youth."' Id. at 665 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. See id. at 645 (noting that Dale wrote to James Kay requesting reason for
Monmouth Council's decision). Dale also requested the permission to attend a
review under the Monmouth Council Review Procedures. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of
Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1205 (N.J. 1999) (explaining that Dale was entitled to review
under Monmouth Council Review Procedures), rev'd, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
9
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bership to homosexuals."' 66 In response to having his adult membership
revoked, Dale filed a complaint against the Boy Scouts in NewJersey Supe-
rior Court.67 Dale alleged that, by revoking his adult membership, the
Boy Scouts violated New Jersey's public accommodations law and New
Jersey common law.
68
The NewJersey Superior Court's Chancery Division granted summary
judgment in favor of the Boy Scouts, holding that New Jersey's public ac-
commodations law was not applicable because the Boy Scouts was not a
place of public accommodation. 69 The court also held "that, alternatively,
the Boy Scouts [was] a distinctly private group" and, therefore, was "ex-
empted from coverage under New Jersey's [public accommodations]
66. Dale, 530 U.S. at 645. According to Justice Stevens, "at that time, no such
standard had been publicly expressed by the BSA." Id. at 665 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
67. See id. at 645 (stating background of Dale's litigation against Boy Scouts in
NewJersey courts).
68. See id. (stating allegations contained in Dale's complaint). New Jersey's
Law Against Discrimination (LAD) provides, in pertinent part:
All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to ob-
tain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any
place of public accommodation, publicly assisted housing accommodation,
and other real property without discrimination because of race, creed,
color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sexual ori-
entation, familial status or sex, subject only to conditions and limitations
applicable alike to all persons. This opportunity is recognized as and de-
clared to be a civil right.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2001) (emphasis added). The LAD defines "a place
of public accommodation" as including, but not limited to:
[A] ny tavern, roadhouse, hotel, motel, trailer camp, summer camp, day
camp, or resort camp, whether for entertainment of transient guests or
accommodation of those seeking health, recreation or rest; any producer,
manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, retail shop, store, establishment,
or concession dealing with goods or services of any kind; any restaurant,
eating house, or place where food is sold for consumption on the prem-
ises; any place maintained for the sale of ice cream, ice and fruit prepara-
tions or their derivatives, soda water or confections, or where any
beverages of any kind are retailed for consumption on the premises; any
garage, any public conveyance operated on land or water, or in the air,
any stations and terminals thereof; any bathhouse, boardwalk, or sea-
shore accommodation; any auditorium, meeting place, or hall; any thea-
tre, motion-picture house, music hall, roof garden, skating rink,
swimming pool, amusement and recreation park, fair, bowling alley, gym-
nasium, shooting gallery, billiard and pool parlor, or other place of
amusement; any comfort station; any dispensary, clinic or hospital; any
public library; any kindergarten, primary and secondary school, trade or
business school, high school, academy, college and university, or any edu-
cational institution under the supervision of the State Board of Educa-
tion, or the Commissioner of Education of the State of New Jersey.
Id. at § 10:5-5(o.
69. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 645 (explaining ruling of NewJersey Superior Court's
Chancery Division). For a further discussion of the definition of a "place of public
accommodation" under the LAD, see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 47: p. 387
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law." 70 Finally, the Chancery Division "concluded that the Boy Scouts' po-
sition [regarding] active homosexuality was clear and held that the First
Amendment freedom of expressive association prevented the government
from forcing the Boy Scouts to accept Dale as an adult leader" through the
public accommodations law. 71
Although the New Jersey Superior Court's Appellate Division af-
firmed the dismissal of Dale's common law claim, it held that NewJersey's
public accommodations law did apply to the Boy Scouts and that the Boy
Scouts did violate it.72 Furthermore, the court rejected the Boy Scouts'
constitutional defenses. 73
Affirming the judgment of the Appellate Division, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court held that the Boy Scouts was a place of public accommoda-
tion subject to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination; that the Boy
Scouts was not exempt from the statute; and that the Boy Scouts violated
the statute when it revoked Dale's adult membership.74 The court then
addressed the federal constitutional defenses that the Boy Scouts raised. 75
First, the court rejected the Boy Scouts' defense that forcing it to include
70. Dale, 530 U.S. at 645. The LAD does not include or apply to "any institu-
tion, bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly
private...." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (West 2001). The New Jersey Superior
Court's Chancery Division also "rejected Dale's common-law claim holding that
New Jersey's policy was embodied in the public accommodations law." Dale, 530
U.S. at 645.
71. Id. at 645-46.
72. See id. at 646 (explaining holding of New Jersey Superior Court's Appel-
late Division).
73. See id. (noting rejection of defenses).
74. See id. (explaining holding of New Jersey Supreme Court). An equally
important, but easily overlooked aspect of the New Jersey Supreme Court's hold-
ing is that the court was the first state supreme court to hold that the Boy Scouts
was a place of public accommodation. SeeJacob M. Carpenter, Note, Dale v. Boy
Scouts of America: Whether the Application of New Jersey's Public Accommodations Law,
Forcing the Boy Scouts to Include an Avowed Homosexual, Violates the Scouts'First Amend-
ment Freedom of Expressive Association, 52 MERCER L. REV. 745, 757 (2001) (noting
novelty of New Jersey Supreme Court holding). Four other state supreme courts
and a United States court of appeals have reached the opposite conclusion. See
Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluding that
Boy Scouts is not place of public accommodation); Curran v. Mount Diablo Coun-
cil of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 239 (Cal. 1998) (holding that Unruh
Civil Rights Act's definition of "all business establishments of every kind whatso-
ever" was not applicable to Boy Scouts); Seabourn v. Coronado Area Council, Boy
Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d 385, 405-06 (Kan. 1995) (concluding that Boy Scouts is not
"place of public accommodation"); Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. v.
Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352, 360 (Conn. 1987)
(concluding that denying female opportunity to serve as Scoutmaster of Boy Scout
troop did not deprive her of "accommodation"); Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of Am.,
551 P.2d 465, 469 (Or. 1976) (holding that Boy Scouts was not "place of public
accommodation" under Oregon Public Accommodation Act); see also Dale, 530
U.S. at 657 n.3 (footnoting cases holding that Boy Scouts is not place of public
accommodation).
75. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 646-47 (discussing New Jersey Supreme Court's find-
ings regarding Boy Scouts' constitutional defenses).
2002] NOTE
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Dale violated the organization's right to intimate association. 76 Second,
the court rejected the Boy Scouts' defense that forcing it to include Dale
violated its right to expressive association. 7 7 Third, the court determined
that New Jersey had a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination
and that the public accommodations law was a permissible way to accom-
plish that goal.
78
B. Narrative Analysis
1. Majority Opinion
In a five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the NewJersey Supreme Court. 79 Chief Justice Rehnquist
76. See id. at 646 (stating finding of New Jersey Supreme Court). Looking to
the factors discussed in Roberts and Rotary Club, the New Jersey Supreme Court
determined that the Boy Scouts' "large size, nonselectivity, inclusive rather than
exclusive purpose, and practice of inviting or allowing nonmembers to attend
meetings, establish that the organization is not 'sufficiently personal or private to
warrant constitutional protection' under freedom of intimate association." Dale v.
Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1221 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
77. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 647 (discussing reasoning of New Jersey Supreme
Court). The New Jersey Supreme Court observed that while the Boy Scouts did
express a belief in moral values and that the purpose of the Boy Scouts' activities
was to promote moral development, there was no evidence that one of the Boy
Scouts' purposes was to promote the immorality of homosexuality. See Boy Scouts of
Am., 734 A.2d at 1223-24, 1228 (holding that because Boy Scouts do not express
views regarding homosexuality, applying LAD did not violate its freedom of expres-
sive association).
78. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 647 (stating that court determined that New Jersey's
public accommodations law was permissible way to accomplish State purposes).
Specifically, the NewJersey Supreme Court explained that it was "unquestionably a
compelling interest of [the] State to eliminate the destructive consequences of
discrimination from our society." Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d at 1227. Further-
more, the court found that the LAD achieved its purpose without regard to the
Boy Scouts' viewpoint and that it abridged "'no more speech or associational free-
dom than is necessary to accomplish [its] purpose."' Id. at 1228 (quoting Roberts
v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984)).
79. See generally Dale, 530 U.S. at 661 (reversing decision of New Jersey Su-
preme Court and holding that applying LAD to force Boy Scouts to include homo-
sexuals violates First Amendment). ChiefJustice Rehnquist delivered the opinion
of the Court and was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas.
See id. at 642-44 (holding that applying LAD to force Boy Scouts to include homo-
sexuals violated First Amendment freedom of association). Justice Stevens pro-
vided one of two dissenting opinions, with Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer
joining his opinion. See id. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with major-
ity's holding and reasoning and arguing that Boy Scouts did not engage in expres-
sive activity). Justice Souter wrote the other dissenting opinion that was joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. See id. at 700-01 (Souter, J., dissenting) (agreeing
with Justice Stevens' dissent but arguing that public opinion toward homosexuality
should not be controlling factor in case). One scholar has argued that, while the
Court split five-to-four, the decision "should have been a relatively easy one" and
that the Court "had more difficulty reaching [the] result than it should have."
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and Schools, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1917, 1919
(2001). The same scholar also stated that the fact that the Court split five-to-four
"on an issue so close to the core of the First Amendment is, to say the least, dis-
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framed the issue in Dale simply as "whether the application of New Jersey's
public accommodations law violated the First Amendment."80 Looking
immediately to Roberts, the majority recognized that "'implicit in the right
to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment' is 'a correspond-
ing right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political,
social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends."'8 1 This right,
the majority emphasized, is necessary to prevent the majority of the people
from forcing its views on groups wishing to express unpopular ideas.8 2
After discussing the right of expressive association, the majority dis-
cussed the types of government action that may unconstitutionally in-
fringe on that right.8 3 Specifically, the Court stated that "[t]he forced
inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group's freedom
of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a signifi-
cant way the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints." 84
"'[F] reedom of association [,] "' the majority recognized, "'plainly presup-
poses a freedom not to associate.' '8 5
The Court noted that to fall within the protection of freedom of ex-
pressive association, a group must engage in public or private expressive
association. 8 6 In evaluating whether the Boy Scouts engaged in expressive
turbing." Id. at 1939. Another scholar has noted that "[a]lthough Dale was a 5-4
decision, with the conservative Justices in the majority, all nine Justices seemed to
agree that First Amendment rights must be enforced even when the implementa-
tion of antidiscrimination laws is at stake." Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws, supra
note 10, at 88-89.
80. Dale, 530 U.S. at 647.
81. Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)).
Citing multiple cases as precedent, the Roberts Court noted that the right to associ-
ate has long been recognized by the Court. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (citing
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-09, 932-33 (1982); Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978);
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977)).
82. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 647-48 ("This right is crucial in preventing the major-
ity from imposing its views on groups that would rather express other, perhaps
unpopular, ideas."); see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 ("According protection to col-
lective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving politi-
cal and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by
the majority.").
83. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 (noting that government actions infringing on
freedom may take many forms). Specifically, the Court recognized that "'intrusion
into the internal structure or affairs of an association' like a 'regulation that forces
the group to accept members it does not desire"' is an unconstitutional intrusion
by the government. Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623). The majority's reason
for this conclusion is clear. Cf id. (arguing that "[f]orcing a group to accept cer-
tain members may impair the ability of the group to express those views, and only
those views, that it intends to express") (emphasis added).
84. Id. (citing N.Y. State Club Ass'n., Inc. v. New York City, 487 U.S. 1, 13
(1988)).
85. Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623) (emphasis added).
86. See id. ("To determine whether a group is protected by the First Amend-
ment's expressive associational right, we must determine whether the group en-
gages in 'expressive association'. . . whether it be public or private.").
13
McGuire: The Supreme Court's Latest Resolution of the Conflict between Fre
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
VILLANOvA LAW REVIEW
activity, the majority examined the Boy Scouts' mission statement and also
quoted the Scout Oath and Law.8 7 Based on these statements, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist found that "the general mission of the Boy Scouts is clear:
'to instill values in young people."'8 8
After explaining that the Boy Scouts do engage in expressive activity,
the majority considered whether including James Dale as an Assistant
Scoutmaster would significantly affect the Boy Scouts' ability to advocate
private or public viewpoints.8 9 In examining this issue, the Court at-
tempted to determine the Boy Scouts' view regarding homosexuality.90
The Boy Scouts claimed that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the
Scout Oath and Law.9 1 Specifically, the Boy Scouts contended that homo-
sexual conduct is inconsistent with the terms "morally straight" and
"clean." 92 Moreover, the Boy Scouts asserted that it "'teaches that homo-
sexual conduct is not morally straight' and that it does "'not want to pro-
mote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."93 Although
the Court went on to review other written evidence in the record, Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated that the Court "accept[ed] the Boy Scouts' asser-
87. See id. (quoting Boy Scouts' mission statement). The Boy Scouts' mission
statement states as follows: "'It is the mission of the Boy Scouts of America to serve
others by helping to instill values in young people and, in other ways, to prepare
them to make ethical choices over their lifetime in achieving their full potential."'
Id. Moreover, the Scout Oath and Law describe the values that the Boy Scouts
strives to instill. See id. (reasoning that Boy Scouts of America engages in expres-
sive activity). The Scout Oath states: "'[O]n my honor I will do my best [t]o do my
duty to God and my country and to obey the Scout Law; [t]o help other people at
all times; [t]o keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight."'
Id. at 648-49. The full text of the Scout Law reads: "'A Scout is Trustworthy, Obedi-
ent, Loyal, Cheerful, Helpful, Thrifty, Friendly, Brave, Courteous, Clean, Kind,
Reverent."' Id. at 649.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 650 (explaining that, because Boy Scouts of America does engage
in expressive activity, Court "must determine whether the forced inclusion of Dale
as an Assistant Scoutmaster would significantly affect the Boy Scouts' ability to ad-
vocate public or private viewpoints").
90. See id. (stating that Court was required to explore Boy Scouts' views toward
homosexuality).
91. See id. (stating Boy Scouts' assertions).
92. See id. (summarizing Boy Scouts' allegation that homosexual conduct con-
flicts with terms in Scout Oath and Law). As the majority noted, neither the Scout
Oath nor the Scout Law mention sexuality or a person's sexual orientation. See id.
("Obviously the Scout Oath and Law do not expressly mention sexuality or sexual
orientation."). Furthermore, regarding the specific terms "morally straight" and
"clean," the majority conceded that:
[they] are by no means self-defining [and that] [d]ifferent people would
attribute to those terms very different meanings. For example, some peo-
ple may believe that engaging in homosexual conduct is not at odds with
being "morally straight" and "clean." And others may believe that engag-
ing in homosexual conduct is contrary to being "morally straight" and
"clean." The Boy Scouts says it falls within the latter category.
Id. (emphasis added). For a further discussion of how the Boy Scouts define the
terms "morally straight" and "clean," see infra note 123 and accompanying text.
93. Dale, 530 U.S. at 651.
400 [Vol. 47: p. 387
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tion" and "need not inquire further to determine the nature of the Boy
Scouts' expression with respect to homosexuality."
9 4
In determining whether or not Dale's forced inclusion would signifi-
candy burden the Boy Scouts' desire not to "'promote homosexual con-
duct as a legitimate form of behavior,"' the majority determined that, just
"[a]s [the Court] gives deference to an association's assertions regarding
the nature of its expression, [it] gives deference to an association's view of
what would impair [that] expression." 95 The Court did, however, recog-
nize that Dale was one of a group of gay Scouts that were leaders in the gay
community. 96 The majority concluded, therefore, that if the Boy Scouts
94. Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted that, because the record contained writ-
ten evidence of the Boy Scouts' position, the Court would look to it as instructive.
See id. (referring to evidence of sincerity of Boy Scouts' beliefs). The Court re-
ferred to written evidence in the form of position statements made by the Boy
Scouts of America. See id. (quoting Boy Scouts' position statements). First, the
Court referred to a 1978 position statement, to the Boy Scouts' Executive Commit-
tee, which was signed by the Boy Scout President and Chief Scout Executive. See id.
(quoting 1978 position statement). Specifically, the Court focused on the follow-
ing language from the position statement:
"Q. May an individual who openly declares himself to be a homosexual
be a volunteer Scout leader?
"A. No. The Boy Scouts of America is a private, membership organiza-
tion and leadership therein is a privilege and not a right. We do not
believe that homosexuality and leadership in Scouting are appropriate.
We will continue to select only those who in our judgment meet our stan-
dards and qualifications for leadership."
Id. at 651-52. Second, the Court referred to a 1991 position statement, which in
the Court's opinion supported the Boy Scouts' current view. See id. at 652 (quoting
1991 position statement). That position statement read: "'We believe that homo-
sexual conduct is inconsistent with the requirement in the Scout Oath that a Scout
be morally straight and in the Scout Law that a Scout be clean in word and deed,
and that homosexuals do not provide a desirable role model for Scouts.'" Id.
Again, in a 1993 position statement, the Scouts stated that "'[t]he Boy Scouts of
America has always reflected the expectations that Scouting families have had for
the organization. We do not believe that homosexuals provide a role model con-
sistent with these expectations. Accordingly, we do not allow for the registration of
avowed homosexuals as members or as leaders of the BSA.'" Id. Finally, the Court
noted that the Boy Scouts' assertions in Dale regarding its position on homosexual-
ity was similar to the Boy Scouts assertions regarding homosexuality in Curran v.
Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts of America, 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998). See id. at
652-53 (citing Boy Scouts' public expression of views toward homosexuals in previ-
ous litigation as evidence of sincerity of Boy Scouts' assertions that it does not
approve of homosexual behavior).
95. Id. at 653. The Court was careful to note that an expressive association
cannot "erect a shield to antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere ac-
ceptance of a member from a particular group would impair its message." Id.
96. See id. ("Dale, by his own admission, is one of a group of gay Scouts who
have 'become leaders in their community and are open and honest about their
sexual orientation."'). The Court also considered Dale's role as co-president of the
Rutgers' Lesbian/Gay Alliance and the fact that he remained a gay rights activist.
See id. (noting Dale's active involvement in gay rights).
15
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were forced to include Dale, it would send a message that it accepted ho-
mosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.9 7
Regarding this conclusion, the majority found Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston9" illustrative. 99 In Hurley, the Court
held that applying a Massachusetts public accommodations law to require
private organizers of Boston's St. Patrick's Day parade to accept a gay
rights group violated the First Amendment. 100 The Court determined
that forcing the Boy Scouts to admit Dale as an Assistant Scoutmaster was
analogous to forcing the organizers of the parade to allow the Hurley
group to march behind its banner. 1 1 Accordingly, the majority con-
cluded that "the presence of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would just as
surely interfere with the Boy Scouts' choice not to propound a point of
view contrary to its beliefs. 10 2
In making this conclusion, the majority directly disagreed with the
reasoning and conclusion of the New Jersey Supreme Court.10 3 The ma-
jority did so for three reasons. 10 4 First, the majority intimated that associa-
tions are entitled to the protection of the First Amendment even if they do
not associate for the purpose of promoting a particular message.10 5 All
that is necessary, the majority argued, is that the association "merely engage
in expressive activity that could be impaired .... -106 Second, although the Boy
Scouts discourages Scout leaders from promoting views on sexual issues,
97. See id.
98. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
99. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 653 (examining whether Dale's presence in Boy
Scouts would send message that Boy Scouts accepts homosexual behavior and us-
ing Hurley as illustrative on this issue).
100. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559 (addressing "whether Massachusetts may re-
quire private citizens who organize a parade to include among the marchers a
group imparting a message the organizers do not wish to convey" and holding
"that such a mandate violates the First Amendment"); see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 653
(explaining briefly facts and issue addressed in Hurley).
101. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 654 (analogizing Dale's presence in Boy Scouts to
that of gay fights group marchers in Boston's St. Patrick's Day Parade).
102. Id.
103. See id. ("The NewJersey Supreme Court determined that the Boy Scouts'
ability to disseminate its message was not significantly affected by the forced inclu-
sion of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster ...."). The New Jersey Supreme Court
reached its conclusion by deciding that "'Boy Scout members do not associate for
the purpose of disseminating the belief that homosexuality is immoral; Boy Scouts
discourages its leaders from disseminating any views on sexual issues; and Boy
Scouts includes sponsors and members who subscribe to different views in respect
of homosexuality."' Id. at 654-55.
104. See id. at 655 (listing reasons for disagreeing with New Jersey Supreme
Court).
105. See id. (arguing that "associations do not have to associate for the 'pur-
pose' of disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the protections
of the First Amendment").
106. Id. (emphasis added). Chief Justice Rehnquist also found that "[t]he
First Amendment's protection of expressive association is not reserved for advo-
cacy groups." Id. at 648.
402 [Vol. 47: p. 387
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the majority noted that the First Amendment protects the Boy Scouts'
method of expression-teaching by example. 10 7 Third, the majority ex-
plained that the First Amendment "simply does not require that every
member of a group agree on every issue in order for the group's policy to
be 'expressive association.' 1 0 8 Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist
made the strong statement that "[t]he fact that the organization does not
trumpet its views from the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its
ranks, does not mean that its views receive no First Amendment
protection."
1 09
The majority then assessed New Jersey's interests.1 10 Without men-
tioning exactly what those interests were, the majority easily concluded
that "[t]he state interests embodied in New Jersey's public accommoda-
tions law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to
freedom of expressive association.""'
Concluding the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that
the majority was not guided by whether or not it believed that the Boy
Scouts' antigay policy was right or wrong.1 1 2 Elaborating, he stated that,
"public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization's expression
does not justify the State's effort to compel the organization to accept
members where such acceptance would derogate from the organization's
expressive language."
1 1 3
107. See id. at 655 ("If the Boy Scouts wishes Scout leaders to avoid questions
of sexuality and teach only by example, this fact does not negate the sincerity of its
belief .... ).
108. Id. In this case, Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that "[t]he Boy
Scouts [took] an official position with respect to homosexual conduct, and that
[was] sufficient for First Amendment purposes." Id.
109. Id. at 656. This statement was in response to Dale's claim that the Boy
Scouts do not revoke the memberships of heterosexual members that disagree
with the policy. See id. at 655 (discussing Dale's claim). Chief Justice Rehnquist
not only found this argument irrelevant but pointed to evidence in the record that
disputed Dale's claim. See id. at 655-56 n.1 (citing record evidence that, according
to Boy Scout officials, any adult members who advocate that homosexual conduct
is moral will not be entitled to membership).
110. See id. at 657 (noting that Court "recognized in cases such as Roberts and
Duarte that States have a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against
women in public accommodations"). Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist recog-
nized that freedom of expressive association is not absolute, and can be overridden
"'by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the sup-
pression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restric-
tive of associational freedoms."' Id. at 648 (quoting Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
111. Id. at 659. "That being the case[,]" Chief Rehnquist stated that "the First
Amendment prohibits the State from imposing such a requirement through the
application of its public accommodations law." Id.
112. See id. at 661 ("We are not, as we must not be, guided by our views of
whether the Boy Scouts' teachings with respect to homosexual conduct are right or
wrong .... ).
113. Id. Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that "'the law.., is not
free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved
17
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2. Dissenting Opinions
In his dissent, Justice Stevens was quick to recognize that the New
Jersey Supreme Court's construction of the term "place of public accom-
modation" has "given its statute a more expansive coverage than most simi-
lar states."' 14  Therefore, Justice Stevens, similar to Chief Justice
Rehnquist, framed the question in Dale as "whether that expansive con-
struction trenches on the federal constitutional rights of the Boy Scouts of
America .... 115
Most importantly, Justice Stevens opined that the Boy Scouts had only
adopted an exclusionary membership policy and did not express a shared
goal of expressing the immorality of homosexual conduct.11 6 Unlike the
majority, which argued that an organization need only engage in an ex-
pressive activity, Justice Stevens argued that "[a]t a minimum, a group
seeking to prevail over an antidiscrimination law must adhere to a clear and
unequivocal view." 117 Justice Stevens' dissent, therefore, argued primarily
that including Dale, and other homosexuals, would not significantly impair
the Boy Scouts' ability to engage in any expressive activity.' 1 8
message or discouraging a disfavored one ....' Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Amer-
ican Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995)).
114. Id. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens explained that "New
Jersey 'prides itself on judging each individual by his or her merits' and on being
'in the vanguard in the fight to eradicate the cancer of unlawful discrimination of
all types from our society."' Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Peper v.
Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 389 A.2d 465, 478 (1978)). Justice Stevens briefly
noted that he considered NewJersey's broad interpretation of its public accommo-
dations law to fall within the states' right to experiment with "things social" and
concluded that the Court, in "exercising its high power[,]" did not accord New
Jersey, a "courageous State[,]" the respect it was due. Id. at 664 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
115. Id. at 663-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of how
ChiefJustice Rehnquist framed the issue in Dale, see supra note 80 and accompany-
ing text.
116. See id. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[tihe evidence
before this Court makes it exceptionally clear that BSA has, at most, simply
adopted an exclusionary membership policy and has no shared goal of disapprov-
ing of homosexuality"). One scholar has argued that Justice Stevens' "formalistic
approach to discerning the Scouts' organizational values ignores the possibility
that the Scouts had never really had to focus on homosexuality until sued by
Dale ...." Peter H. Schuck, Diversity Demands Exclusivity, AM. LAw., Sept. 12, 2000,
at 69. As the majority itself acknowledged, however, the Boy Scouts had already
been sued for discriminating against homosexuals in a factual scenario similar to
that in Dale. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 652 (noting that "throughout a California case
with similar facts filed in the early 1980's, the Boy Scouts consistently asserted the
same position with respect to homosexuality .... ); see also Curran v. Mount Diablo
Council of Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 219 (Cal. 1998) (stating facts of case
and noting that plaintiff was former Eagle Scout who had application for Assistant
Scoutmaster position declined because he publicly avowed that he was homosexual
and believed it was moral).
117. Dale, 530 U.S. at 676 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
118. See id. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is 'no basis in the record
for concluding that admission of [homosexuals] will impede the [Boy Scouts']
404
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Moreover, Justice Stevens strongly opposed the majority's deference
to both the Boy Scouts' assertions regarding its expressive view towards
homosexuality and to the Boy Scouts' views of what would significantly im-
pair those expressions. 1 9 In Justice Stevens' view, the Court should have
first reviewed whether the Boy Scouts was in fact expressing any message
and, second, whether applying NewJersey's Law Against Discrimination to
force the Boy Scouts to admit homosexuals would significantly impair that
message.1
20
In conducting his analysis, Justice Stevens examined statements, docu-
ments and other factors related to the purpose of the Boy Scouts, includ-
ing its mission statement and federal charter. 12 1 Specifically, he disagreed
ability to engage in [its] protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views'
and NewJersey's law 'requires no change in [BSA's] creed."') (quoting Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626-27 (1984) (alterations in original)).
119. See id. at 685 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's insis-
tence of giving "deference to an association's assertions regarding the nature of its
expression" and further giving "deference to an association's view of what would
impair its expression"). Justice Stevens went so far as to call the majority's ap-
proach an "astanding view of the law." Id. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens also stated that he was "unaware of any previous instance in which [the
Court's] analysis of the scope of a constitutional right was determined by looking
at what a litigant asserts in his or her brief and inquiring no further." Id. (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Stevens found it "even more astonishing in
the First Amendment area, because, as the majority itself acknowledge[d] 'we are
obligated to independently review the factual record."' Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens argued that "[i]t is an odd form of independent review that consists
of deferring entirely to whatever a litigant claims." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Finally, Justice Stevens cautioned, "unless one is prepared to turn the right to asso-
ciate into a free pass of out of antidiscrimination laws, an independent inquiry is a
necessity." Id. at 688 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. See id. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[W]e must inquire whether the
group is, in fact, expressing a message (whatever it may be) and whether that mes-
sage (if one is expressed) is significantly affected by a State's antidiscrimination
law."). Moreover, Justice Stevens believed "that inquiry requires [the Court's] inde-
pendent analysis, rather than deference to a group's litigating posture." Id. (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). In discussing the need for an independent analysis, Justice
Stevens argued, inter alia, that if the Court deferred:
to whatever position an organization is prepared to assert in its briefs,
there would be no way to mark the proper boundary between genuine
exercises of the right to associate, on the one hand, and sham claims that
are simply attempts to insulate nonexpressive private discrimination, on
the other hand.
Id. at 687 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. See id. at 666 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting excerpts from Boy Scouts'
mission statement and federal charter). The Boy Scouts' federal charter declares
its purpose as:
to promote, through organization, and cooperation with other agencies,
the ability of boys to do things for themselves and others, to train them in
scoutcraft, and to teach them patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kin-
dred values, using the methods which were in common use by Boy Scouts
on June 15, 1916.
Id. (quoting 36 U.S.C. § 23 (current version at 36 U.S.C. § 30902 (2001))). For a
further discussion of the Boy Scouts' mission statement, see supra note 87 and
accompanying text.
19
McGuire: The Supreme Court's Latest Resolution of the Conflict between Fre
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
with the Boy Scouts' contention that homosexual behavior is contrary to
the requirements in the Scout Oath that a Scout remain "morally straight"
and in the Scout Law that a Scout be "clean." 122 After quoting excerpts
from various Scouting materials explaining the requirements of remaining
"morally straight" and "clean," Justice Stevens concluded that "[i]t [was]
plain as the light of day that neither of these principles . . . [said] the
slightest thing about homosexuality."1 23 Justice Stevens also emphasized
that Scouts were not encouraged to talk to their Scoutmaster about sexual
matters and that Scoutmasters, in turn, were discouraged from answering
Scouts' questions relating to such matters. 124
122. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 667 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that to "bol-
ster" its claim, Boy Scouts pointed to term "morally straight" in Scout Oath and
word "clean" in Scout Law).
123. Id. at 668 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens went further saying,
"Indeed, neither term in the Boy Scouts' Law and Oath expresses any position
whatsoever on sexual matters." Id. at 668-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Regarding
the term "morally straight," Justice Stevens looked to the fact that:
The Boy Scout Handbook defines "morally straight" as such:
"To be a person of strong character, guide your life with honesty,
purity, and justice. Respect and defend the rights of all people.
Your relationships with others should be honest and open. Be clean
in your speech and actions, and faithful in your religious beliefs.
The values you follow as a Scout will help you become virtuous and
self-reliant."
The Scoutmaster Handbook emphasizes these points about being "mor-
ally straight":
"In any consideration of moral fitness, a key word has to be "cour-
age." A boy's courage to do what his head and his heart tell him is
right. And the courage to refuse to do what his heart and his head
say is wrong. Moral fitness, like emotional fitness, will clearly present
opportunities for wise guidance by an alert Scoutmaster."
Id. at 667 (Stevens, J., dissenting (citation omitted)). Regarding the term "clean,"
Justice Stevens looked to the fact that:
As for the term "clean," the Boy Scout Handbook offers the following:
"A Scout is CLEAN. A Scout keeps his body and mind fit and clean. He
chooses the company of those who live by these same ideals. He helps keep his
home and community clean.
"You never need to be ashamed of dirt that will wash off. If you play
hard and work hard you can't help getting dirty. But when the game
is over or the work is done, that kind of dirt disappears with soap and
water.
"There's another kind of dirt that won't come off by washing. It is
the kind that shows up in foul language and harmful thoughts.
"Swear words, profanity, and dirty stories are weapons that ridicule
other people and hurt their feelings. The same is true of racial slurs
and jokes making fun of ethnic groups or people with physical or
mental limitations. A Scout knows there is no kindness or honor in
such mean-spirited behavior. He avoids it in his own words and
deeds. He defends those who are targets of insults."
Id. at 667-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. See id. at 669 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that while Scouts are
not forbidden from asking Scoutmasters questions of sexual nature, "Scoutmasters
are, literally, the last person Scouts are encouraged to ask" and that, "[m]oreover,
Scoutmasters are specifically directed to steer curious adolescents to other sources
[Vol. 47: p. 387
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Regarding the sponsorship of the Boy Scouts, Justice Stevens noted
that multiple religious organizations, some of which do not view homosex-
uality as immoral, sponsor the Boy Scouts. 12 5 Therefore, he concluded it
was "even more difficult to discern any shared goals or common moral
stance on homosexuality.
1 26
of information"). Justice Stevens looked to the instructions given to Scouts in the
Boy Scout Handbook to reach his first conclusion regarding Scouts being discour-
aged from asking their Scoutmaster questions about sexual matters: "'If you
[Scouts] have questions about growing up, about relationships, sex, or making
good decisions, ask. Talk to your parents, religious leaders, teachers, or Scoutmas-
ter."' Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). In reaching his second con-
clusion regarding the Boy Scouts' instructions to Scoutmasters on how to handle
questions from Scouts about sexual matters, Justice Stevens relied on the following
instructions given to Scoutmasters: "'If Scouts ask for information regarding ...
sexual activity, answer honestly and factually, but stay within your realm of exper-
tise and comfort. If a Scout has serious concerns that you cannot answer, refer
him to his family, religious leader, doctor, or other professional."' Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Finally, Justice Stevens pointed to specific rules that Scoutmasters are
to follow if sexual questions arise. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting three
rules for Scoutmasters concerning sexual issues). The first rule quoted by Justice
Stevens states: "You do not undertake to instruct Scouts, in any formalized manner, in the
subject of sex and family life. The reasons are that it is not construed to be Scouting's proper
area, and that you are probably not well qualified to do this." Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
125. See id. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "many diverse religious
organizations sponsor local Boy Scout troops" and that "a number of religious
groups do not view homosexuality as immoral or wrong and reject discrimination
against homosexuals . . .").
126. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also criticized the majority's
use of position statements issued by the Boy Scouts to "fill the void." Id. at 671
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens specifically criticized the use of the posi-
tion statement issued by the Boy Scouts in 1978. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that "when the entire 1978 letter is read, BSA's position is far more equivo-
cal.. ."). Justice Stevens pointed to the following question and answer from that
position statement as supportive of his argument:
"Q. Should a professional or non-professional individual who openly de-
clares himself to be a homosexual be terminated?"
"A. Yes, in the absence of any law to the contrary. At the present time we are
unaware of any statute or ordinance in the United States which prohibits
discrimination against individual's employment upon the basis of homo-
sexuality. In the event that such a law was applicable, it would be necessary for
the Boy Scouts of America to obey it .... "
Id. at 672 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens then attacked the letter as not
establishing any clear policy against homosexuality on four points. See id. (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("Four aspects of the 1978 policy statement are relevant to the
proper disposition of the case."). First, Justice Stevens argued that the letter "sim-
ply adopts an exclusionary membership policy" that is insufficient "by itself, to pre-
vail on a right to associate claim." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Second, he
contended that because the letter was never made public, it remained a "secret
Boy Scouts policy." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Therefore, he stated that the pol-
icy of the Boy Scouts, at least as expressed, remained "one of tolerance, welcoming
all classes of boys and young men." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Third, Justice
Stevens maintained that the drafters of the letter "foresaw the possibility that laws
against discrimination might one day be amended to protect homosexuals from
employment discrimination" and that they "clearly provided that, in the event such
21
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Justice Stevens also strongly disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that Dale's "mere presence among the Boy Scouts will itself force the
group to convey a message about homosexuality .... -127 Arguing that the
majority's reliance on Hurley was erroneous, Justice Stevens noted as signif-
icant that "Dale did not carry a banner or a sign; he did not distribute any
fact sheet; and he expressed no intent to send any message.' 28 Justice
Stevens' dissent concluded that unfavorable opinions "'about homosexu-
als have ancient roots"' and that these roots "have been nourished by sec-
tarian doctrine." 129 By creating a constitutional shield for policies that are
a law conflicted with their policy, a Scout's duty to be 'obedient' and 'obe[y] the
laws,' even if 'he thinks [the laws] are unfair' would prevail in such a contingency."
Id. at 672-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alterations in original). Finally, Justice Ste-
vens noted that the "1978 statement simply says homosexuality is not 'appropri-
ate"' and that it made "no effort to connect that statement to a shared goal or
expressive activity of the Boy Scouts." Id. at 673 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While
Justice Stevens analyzed four other position statements issued by the Boy Scouts
between 1991 and 1993 and relied upon by the majority, he simply stated that
"[a]ll of them were written and issued between 1991 and 1993. All of them were
written and issued after BSA revoked Dale's membership. Accordingly, they have
little, if any, relevance to the legal question before this Court." Id. at 673-74 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 692 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 694-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Expanding on this argument, Jus-
tice Stevens conceded that "[iut is true, of course, that some acts are so imbued
with symbolic meaning that they qualify as 'speech' under the First Amendment."
Id. at 695 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens contended, however, that
"[alt] hough participating in the Scouts could itself conceivably send a message on
some level, it is not the kind of act that we have recognized as speech." Id. (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Stevens concluded:
Indeed, if merely joining a group did constitute symbolic speech; and
such speech were attributable to the group being joined; and that group
has the right to exclude that speech (and hence, the right to exclude that
person from joining), then the right of free speech effectively becomes a
limitless right to exclude for every organization, whether or not it en-
gages in any expressive activities. That cannot be, and never has been,
the law.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 699 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 192 (1986)). Specifically, Justice Stevens' comments regarding negative opin-
ions of homosexuals, the relationship of those opinions to religious doctrine and
the relevance of those opinions in cases such as Dale have found both support and
criticism from judges and scholars. Compare id. at 660 (arguing that greater socie-
tal acceptance of homosexuality "is scarcely an argument for denying First Amend-
ment protection to those who refuse to accept these views"), and Paulsen, supra
note 79, at 1917 (callingJustice Stevens' dissent "stunningly bigoted" and "one of
the most intolerant-of-religion opinions ever to appear in the U.S. Reports"), with
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 170 (Harvard Law Review Ass'n eds., 1990)
(concluding that "discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation persists
throughout American society and the American legal system"), and Eskridge, supra
note 30, at 2416 (arguing that "antireligious prejudice has manifested itself in
American history in ways not unlike antihomosexual prejudice").
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a product of homosexual prejudice, Justice Stevens argued that the Court
would only aggravate those prejudices. 130
Justice Souter authored a brief dissent agreeing almost entirely with
Justice Stevens. 13 ' Regarding Justice Stevens' comments toward public
opinions of homosexuality, however, Justice Souter stated that they should
not to be a controlling factor in the case.132
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF DALE
Unlike the Court's prior freedom of association versus public accom-
modations law cases, the Court in Dale for the first time ruled that a public
accommodations law was unconstitutional because it infringed on a
group's right of expressive association.' 3 3 According to one scholar, Dale
therefore "significantly reduced the threat that antidiscrimination laws
once posed to constitutionally protected civil liberties."' 34 The decision in
Dale certainly leaves some open questions, including what organizations
will be entitled to the protection of freedom of expressive association. 135
While some organizations will certainly benefit more than others, it is un-
clear what Dale's impact will be on the Court's approach to expressive asso-
ciation defenses. 136 Part IV therefore concentrates on the three groups
130. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 700 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that harm
caused by homosexual prejudice can only be aggravated by creation of constitu-
tional protection for policies that are product of that prejudice).
131. See generally id. at 700-02 (Souter, J., dissenting) (joining Justice Stevens'
dissent but noting that public attitudes toward homosexuals should not be control-
ling factor in case).
132. See id. at 701 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that Court's "cognizan [ce]
of... laudable decline in stereotypical thinking on homosexuality should not...
be taken to control the resolution of this case").
133. See id. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that, until Dale, Court had
.never once found a claimed right to associate in the selection of members to
prevail in the face of a State's antidiscrimination law"); see also Bernstein, Expressive
Association, supra note 13, at 624 ("In Dale, the Supreme Court clearly held for the
first time that the right of expressive association trumps an antidiscrimination
law."); Carpenter, supra note 74, at 751 (explaining that in Dale, Court broke from
trend set in previous cases and held, for first time, that public accommodations law
was unconstitutional for infringing on group's right of expressive association).
134. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws, supra note 10, at 88. One scholar ar-
gues that persons "who agree with the fundamental premise of the First Amend-
ment- that government cannot be trusted to establish and fairly police the
boundaries of acceptable speech, expressive association, and religious expres-
sion-can now rest a little easier." Id. at 139.
135. See id. at 126 (discussing Dale's impact on freedom of association and
noting that "Dale did not clearly specify which organizations will receive constitu-
tional protection on freedom of association grounds from antidiscrimination
laws").
136. But see id. at 127 (arguing that "[a] mong expressive organizations, relig-
ious organizations will most likely be the primary beneficiaries of Dale'). Accord-
ing to one scholar, Dale "gives religious organizations newfound autonomy from
certain antidiscrimination laws .. " Id. at 128. Regarding the expanded rights of
religious organizations, the same scholar argues, for example, that Dale protects
the fight of church schools to fire unmarried female teachers or employees that
23
McGuire: The Supreme Court's Latest Resolution of the Conflict between Fre
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
that will be the most impacted by Dale: the Boy Scouts of America, homo-
sexual individuals and gay rights advocacy groups.' 37
A. Impact on the Boy Scouts of America
The Boy Scouts of America achieved a clear legal victory in Dale.138
On the other hand, in the court of public opinion and within the organi-
zation itself, its victory has not been as clear. 13 9 First, the publicity of the
become pregnant. See id. at 130 (arguing that "under Dale church schools have a
constitutional right to fire teachers who become pregnant out of wedlock if sex
outside of marriage is frowned upon by the sponsoring church"). But see Ganzy v.
Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (refusing to grant de-
fendant school's motion for summary judgment because "[p]laintiff's evidence...
might lead ajury to find that the religious reason-premarital sex-for the termi-
nation is a pretext"); Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 808 (N.D.
Cal. 1992) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment because although
"defendants' dislike of pregnancy outside of marriage stems from a religious be-
lief ... it does not automatically exempt the termination decision from Title VII
scrutiny"); Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 271 (N.D. Iowa 1980)
(denying defendant's resisted motion to dismiss and, in alternative, for summary
judgment on plaintiffs action under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 because
even where defendant school's religious code "truly constitutes a legitimate relig-
ious [bona fide occupation qualification], the law nonetheless requires that it not
be applied discriminatorily on the basis of sex; that is, unequally to defendant's
male and female lay teacher employees"). The same scholar acknowledges that his
example and conclusion are contrary to federal precedent. See Bernstein, Antidis-
crimination Laws, supra note 10, at 130 (acknowledging that example is "contrary to
holdings of three federal courts").
137. For a further discussion of the impact that Dale may have on the Boy
Scouts of America, homosexual individuals and gay rights advocacy groups, see
infra notes 138-90 and accompanying text.
138. For a discussion of the facts of Dale and the majority's holding and rea-
soning, see supra notes 53-113 and accompanying text.
139. See Peter Ferrara, The Battle over the Boy Scouts; A Year After the Supreme
Court Decision, it's a Standoff WKLY. STANDARD, June 11, 2001, at 21 (arguing that
"[a]s with many court decisions, this was not the end but just the beginning of a
culture war"); David France, Scouts Divided, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 6, 2001, at 44, 46 (ex-
plaining that while recent polls suggest that most Americans agree with Court's
ruling, growing number of Americans do not approve of exclusionary policy); An-
drewJacobs, The Supreme Court: The Reaction; Victory Has Consequences of Its Own, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2000, at A28 (explaining that because of increased public toler-
ance toward gays, Boy Scouts' victory may harm organization);Joyce Howard Price,
Gay Critics Continue To Pursue Boy Scouts, WASH. TIMES, June 28, 2001, at Al (ex-
plaining that, although Supreme Court ruled in Boy Scouts' favor, groups are still
lobbying against antigay policy); Anna Quindlen, The Right to Be Ordinary, NEWS-
WEEK, Sept. 11, 2000, at 82 (stating that on paper gay Scoutmaster (Dale) lost, but
Scouting officials are ones that are taking beating); Patty Reinert, Gay Policy's Fall-
out Lingers in Boy Scouts; Ban Mobilizes Critics a Year After Ruling, HoUSTON CHRON.,
June 24, 2001, at Al (reporting that publicity surrounding case has motivated
more people to speak out against Boy Scouts); Kate Zernike, Scouts' Successful Ban
on Gays Is Followed by Loss in Support, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2000, at Al (stating that
following Supreme Court case, corporate and governmental support for Scouts has
slipped markedly); 60 Minutes: The Boy Scouts; Policy of the Boy Scouts to Disallow
Homosexuals in to Their Ranks, (CBS television broadcast, July 8, 2001) (asking
"[d]id the Boy Scouts lose more than they gained when the Supreme Court ...
[Vol. 47: p. 387
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Dale case has hurt the Boy Scouts' ability to obtain funding and support
from public and private groups.' 40 Furthermore, the case's publicity has
led to a possible backlash against the Boy Scouts' antigay policy within the
organization.
141
1. Loss of Public and Private Support
The list of public and private organizations questioning their support
of Scouting is extensive. 142 For example, one of the Boy Scouts' most im-
portant contributors, the United Way, is beginning to withdraw its support
and funding.'14  The executive director of a United Way chapter stated
that he was "stunned at how swiftly and strongly his board had acted to cut
support to any Scout troops that did not sign a form saying they would not
endorse the Scouts' ban on gays." 144 Recently, at least at the local level, it
seems that the efforts of United Ways may be working) 45 For example, at
least one local Boy Scout council, in an effort to avoid losing funding from
the United Way, signed a letter agreeing not to discriminate. 1 46
ruled 5-to-4 that they had a legal right to exclude from their ranks what the Scouts
call 'avowed homosexuals"').
140. For a further discussion of the impact that the publicity of the Dale case
has had on the Boy Scouts' ability to raise funding, see infra notes 142-60 and
accompanying text.
141. For a further discussion of the impact that Dale has had on the Boy
Scouts internally, see infra notes 161-71 and accompanying text.
142. See France, supra note 139, at 47 (listing organizations and corporations
that are distancing themselves from Boy Scouts); Nat Hentoff, Groups Wage War
Against Boy Scouts in the Name of Political Correctness, PITTSBURGH POsT-GAZETTE, June
15, 2001, at A27 (listing organizations that are opposing Boy Scouts' policy).
143. See France, supra note 139, at 47 (stating that forty-four of most affluent
United Way chapters blocked or changed funding to comply with own non-dis-
crimination policies). According to the national office of the United Way, the
organization contributes more than eighty-three million dollars a year to national
Boy Scout councils. See Maria Newman, United Way to Continue Aid to Central Jersey
Scouts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2001, at B5 (reporting annual amount United Way
organization donates to national Boy Scout councils). According to another re-
port, the number of United Ways withdrawing support is up to forty-six. See ScouT.
ING FOR ALL, LIST OF UNITED WAYS THAT HAVE WITHDRAWN THEIR FUNDING OF THE
BSA, available at http://www.scoutingforall.org/aaic/unitedway2.shtml (last vis-
ited Nov. 13, 2001) (calling on all United Ways to withdraw support for Boy Scouts
and thanking those United Ways that have already withdrawn funding from
Scouts).
144. Zernike, supra note 139, at Al.
145. See Newman, supra note 143, at B5 (reporting that, according to United
Way officials, some local troops are adopting nondiscrimination policies to "ap-
pease their sponsors").
146. See id. (explaining that United Way of Central New Jersey will continue
to support local Scouting group after it signed letter agreeing not to discriminate
against homosexuals). Furthermore, it was reported that the Central New Jersey
Council is joining a number of councils that have admitted, although quietly, that
they do not support the national policy. See id. (reporting that some other local
troops are adopting nondiscrimination policies to satisfy sponsors). The United
Way of Central New Jersey represents four hundred troops and provides a signifi-
cant amount of money, $81,350, annually, as well. See id. (reporting that Central
2002] NOTE
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Corporate America and the business community are also reconsider-
ing their funding of Boy Scout troops.147 For example, organizations such
as Levi Straus, Wells Fargo, Fleet Bank, CVS, the Philadelphia Foundation
and the Communications Workers of America are distancing themselves
from the Boy Scouts.14 8 These efforts by private corporations and busi-
nesses to force the Boy Scouts to change its national policy, however, have
met opposition. 149 Moreover, some corporations, such as Merrill Lynch,
Textron and Procter Gamble, continue to fund Scouts.'
50
Local and federal politics have also been affected.' 5 1 For example,
some cities are questioning whether or not they should continue to sup-
port Scouting through the use of public facilities.' 52 Furthermore, local
Jersey council will receive $81,350 for fiscal year beginningJuly 1, 2001). Accord-
ing to the Executive Director of the Central New Jersey Council, he believed that
his signature on the United Way's policy does not conflict with the national policy.
See Frances Carroll, Scout Council Won't Bar Homosexuals; Parts Company with National
Group's Policy, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Neptune, N.J.), Aug. 30, 2001, at A3 (quoting
Executive Director as stating that he would not "sign (the United Way policy) un-
less [he] was comfortable it . . . was compatible with the Boy Scouts of
America...").
147. See France, supra note 139, at 47 (noting multiple corporations that have
cut back or stopped funding Scouts); Michael A. Wilson, Corporate America Must
Rise in Support of Scouts, INSIGHT ON NEWS, Oct. 30, 2000, at 45 (explaining that
corporate and business leaders have turned against Scouts).
148. See France, supra note 139, at 47 (listing corporations that are distancing
themselves from Scouting along with other public and private Boy Scout support-
ers). While these businesses are representative of those that have stopped funding,
the list is far more extensive. See, e.g., SCOUTING FOR ALL, LIST OF CORPORATIONS
WHO REFUSE TO FUND THE BSA (listing businesses that have stopped funding Boy
Scouts), available at http://www.scoutingforall.org/aaic/corplist.shtml (last visited
Nov. 13, 2001). According to the Scouting For All website, the following corpora-
tions and businesses have stopped funding the Boy Scouts of America until it re-
scinds its antigay policy: Levi Strauss & Company, J.P. Morgan, American Airlines,
Medtronic, Inc. of Minneapolis, MN, Wells Fargo of Portland Oregon, Portland
General Gas & Electric of Portland Oregon, The Providence Journal, Textron,
Fleet Bank, IBM Corporation and CVS/Pharmacy Stores. See id. (listing corpora-
tions that refuse to support Boy Scouts until Boy Scouts abandons its policy of
excluding membership to homosexuals).
149. See Wilson, supra note 147, at 45 (arguing that corporate and business
leaders have "caved in to ... gay-orchestrated pressure and turned against the Boy
Scouts").
150. See France, supra note 139, at 47 (explaining that these companies "stead-
fastly support" Scouting).
151. For a further discussion of the reaction of local and federal politicians
and groups, see infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
152. See France, supra note 139, at 47 (stating that Chicago, San Francisco,
San Diego and other cities have stopped allowing Scouts to use public places such
as parks and municipal sites for meetings). Often, these cities had no choice be-
cause they are required to comply with ordinances prohibiting antigay discrimina-
tion. See id. (reporting that numerous cities have "ordinances and policies long in
place [that] prohibit public support of anti-gay discrimination there"). The re-
sponse of some cities to the holding in Dale is not all that surprising. Cf Brief of
the Cities of Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Portland, San Francisco,
and Tuscon as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 5, Boy Scouts of Am. v.
[Vol. 47: p. 387
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss2/3
2002] NoTE
school districts, major contributors to scouting activities, have taken a sec-
ond look at their policies toward the Boy Scouts. 15 3 One of the most nota-
ble instances occurred in November 2000 when the Broward County
School Board in Florida voted unanimously to ban Scouts from using pub-
lic schools to hold meetings and recruitment drives. 154 In March 2001,
however, a federal district judge ruled that the Board's policy was discrimi-
natory and enjoined the Board from enforcing it.155 In June 2001, in re-
sponse to such efforts by school districts, both the United States House
and Senate approved measures that would withhold federal money from
any school or district that discriminates against the Boy Scouts. 156 Senator
Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699) (arguing that "[t]he interconnection be-
tween the Boy Scouts and the government provides cities and states with a particu-
larly compelling interest in eradicating ... discrimination"). The efforts of cities
to try to force the Boy Scouts to change its national policy are causing some local
troops to challenge the policy. See Eric Lipton, Local Scouting Board, Calling Gay
Ban "Stupid," Urges End to National Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2001, at B3 (reporting
that Greater New York Councils, Boy Scouts of America, announced decision to
challenge national policy after City Council threatened to prohibit government
agencies from sponsoring Scouts' Law Enforcement Explorers Program).
153. See Edward Wyatt, Education Bill May Omit Its Provision on Boy Scouts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2001, § 1, at 22 (stating that school districts in at least a dozen
cities have taken steps to limit funding and sponsorship of Boy Scouts). According
to other reports, approximately 359 school districts in ten states have taken action
against the Boy Scouts because of its national policy. See Price, supra note 139, at
Al (reporting that multiple groups, including school districts, are lobbying against
Boy Scouts' national policy). According to another recent report, school boards
have cut funding to the Boy Scouts at 4,418 schools across the United States. See
Changing Values More Acceptance of Gays, CHARLESTON GAZEYIE, Aug. 9, 2001, at 4A
(reporting that loss in support was backlash against Court's ruling in Dale). In
December 2000, the Chancellor of New York City schools issued an order prohibit-
ing city schools from sponsoring Scout troops and forbidding the Boy Scouts from
recruiting during school hours. See Anemona Hartocollis, Queens Board, in Revolt,
Attacks Levy Over Restrictions on Boy Scout Access, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2000, at B3 (re-
porting that Chancellor Harold 0. Levy's order stated that Scouts' policy contra-
dicts Board of Education rules prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation).
154. See Wyatt, supra note 153, at 22 (reporting that Broward County School
Board "voted unanimously.., to ban the Scouts from using public schools to hold
meetings and recruitment drives").
155. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Till, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2001)
(enjoining "Defendants, their agents, employees, and successors ... from prevent-
ing the Boy Scouts from using Broward County public school facilities and buses
during the off school hours by reason of the Boy Scouts' membership policy").
156. See Wyatt, supra note 153, at 22 (explaining that measures "would with-
hold federal money from schools or districts that deny a fair opportunity to meet
or that discriminate against the Boy Scouts or any youth group 'that prohibit the
acceptance of homosexuals"'); Ian Christopher McCaleb, Senate Approves Education
Bill After Lengthy Debate, June 15, 2001 (reporting that Senate approved amendment
by 52-48 vote), at http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/06/14/sen-
ate.education/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2001) . In September 2000, the
House also voted against legislation that would have revoked the Boy Scouts fed-
eral charter. See House Backs Boy Scouts in Vote Over Gay Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
2000, at A21 (reporting that House solidly supported Scouts by voting 362-12
against effort to revoke Boy Scouts' federal charter); House Rejects Effort to Revoke
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Helms of North Carolina, one of the amendments' sponsors, stated on the
Senate floor that the measures were in response to the organized efforts of
gays and lesbians. 157
Finally, multiple religious organizations have denounced the Scouts'
policy. 158 InJanuary 2001, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations
asked synagogues to stop sponsoring Scouts and encouraged congregants
to pull their children out of Scouting.1 59 On the Scouts' side, the Mor-
mon and Roman Catholic Churches support the antigay policy.' 60
2. Disagreement Within the Boy Scouts
Along with the efforts of outside organizations to change the Boy
Scouts' policy, within the Boy Scouts of America itself there is some disa-
greement over whether the organization should continue to enforce its
antigay policy. 161 According to the organization's own polls, thirty per-
Boy Scouts Charter, Sept. 13, 2000 (reporting that legislation was offered by Repre-
sentative Lynn Woolsey, Democrat from California), at http://www.cnn.com/
2000/LAW/09/13/boyscouts.congress.02/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2001).
The Representative sponsoring the legislation stated that she knew "the value of
Scouting" and believed that "Scouting should be available to all boys, notjust some
boys." Id. In response, a spokesman for the Boy Scouts stated that the Boy Scouts
"were disappointed that this bill would even get considered .... Id. Republicans
called the proposal an "attack on American values." House Backs Boy Scouts in Vote
Over Gay Issue, supra.
157. See McCaleb, supra note 156 (quoting Senator Jesse Helms).
158. See France, supra note 139, at 46 (explaining that some religious organi-
zations have asked Scouts to reconsider its policy).
159. See id. (explaining that Union of American Hebrew Congregations issued
"remarkable public denunciation"). Recently, the Jewish Community Center in
Stamford, Connecticut ended a fifty-year relationship with the Boy Scouts by cut-
ting its support for a local troop. See Jewish Center Cuts Its Ties to Boy Scouts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2001, § 1, at 31 (explaining thatJewish Community Center ended
its relationship with Boy Scouts because of Boy Scouts' antigay policy).
160. See France, supra note 139, at 46 (reporting that Mormon and Roman
Catholic churches support 750,000 Scouts combined). According to one report,
the United Methodists, Southern Baptists and Mormons believe the Scouts' policy
on homosexual membership is "in keeping with God's position on homosexuality
as a sin or abomination." Marian Dozier, JCCS Break Ranks with Ban on Boy Scouts,
SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Jan. 27, 2001, at lB.
161. See France, supra note 139, at 50 (reporting that some local troops are
adopting their own nondiscrimination policies); Newman, supra note 143, at B5
(reporting that some local troops are publicly disagreeing with national policy);
Reinert, supra note 139, at Al (stating that defiant Scout troops are fighting policy
from within); Richard Renaldi, Three Decades of Discrimination; Boy Scouts of America's
Discrimination Against Gays, ADvoc., Jan. 16, 2001, at 55 (reporting that thousands
of Eagle Scouts, leaders and others involved in Scouting are protesting Boy Scouts'
national policy); see also SCOUTING FOR ALL, SOME SCOUT COUNCILS OF THE BSA
QUESTION AND SOME DEFY THEIR POLICY OF DISCRIMINATION (noting that some
Scout Councils across country were opposed to policy even before Dale), available
at http://www.scoutingforall.org/aaic/defy.shtml (last visited Nov. 14, 2001). In
1999, the Indiana Council of St. Paul, Minnesota requested that the Boy Scouts
"establish a commission to study the BSA membership requirements and the role
of the chartered organization in selecting leaders." Id.
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cent of Scout parents do not support continuing the policy. 162 One for-
mer Eagle Scout candidly stated that, while "'Boy Scouts is an important
organization[,] ... they need to change their policy.""q 63 In Spring 2001,
the Boy Scouts lost a national figurehead when Steven Spielberg, a former
Eagle Scout, resigned from the organization's advisory board.
16 4
Perhaps the most outspoken and organized revolt of Boy Scout mem-
bers is Scouting For All, an organization founded in 1997 by Steven Cozza,
a non-gay, life-long Scout. 16 5 Recently, Scott Cozza, Steven Cozza's father
and the President of Scouting For All, sent a letter and resolution to the
Boy Scouts requesting, inter alia, that it change its national policy and
admit anyone who was excluded in the past based on the antigay policy.
1 6 6
162. See France, supra note 139, at 46 (reporting percentage of Scout parents
opposing national policy and noting that some members are "considering Boy
Scouts no better than a whites-only country club").
163. Tony Freemantle, Houstonians Protest Scouts' Anti-Gay Policy, HOUSTON
CHRON., Aug. 22, 2000, at A19. The same former Eagle Scout, Bruce Reeves,
helped organize a protest in Houston in August 2000. See id. (quoting Mr. Reeves
and noting he organized Houston protest). Regarding the attempt to change the
Boy Scouts' policy, Mr. Reeves remarked, "if we need to get down and dirty with
them to change [the policy], then that is what we will do." Id.
164. See France, supra note 139, at 46 (explaining that Spielberg ended his
service on Advisory Board because he could not support group that practices dis-
crimination); Spielberg: Boy Scouts Discriminate, Apr. 24, 2001 (stating that Steven
Spielberg ended his ten year service on Boy Scouts' Advisory Board), at http://
www.cnn.com/2001/SHOWBIZ/News/04/17/showbuzz/index.html (last visited
Nov. 14, 2001). Spielberg stated that his reason for ending his service was that he
could not serve a group that engaged in "intolerance and discrimination." France,
supra note 139, at 46. Spielberg stated, however, that he would be happy to recon-
sider his role on the Advisory Board "'once scouting fully opens its doors to all who
desire the same experience that so fully enriched [him] as a young person .
Spielberg: Boy Scouts Discriminate, supra.
165. See SCOTT CozzA, SCOUTING FOR ALL'S RESOLUTION TO THE Boy SCOUTS
OF AMERICA, As IT RELATES TO GAY YOUTH AND ADULTS, AND ATHEISTS IN SCOUTING
(stating that Scouting For All is organization inspired by courage of Steven Cozza,
twelve year-old life-long Scout, who wanted to take stand against Boy Scouts' anti-
gay policy), available at http://www.scoutingforall.org/aaic/resolution.shtml (last
visited Nov. 14, 2001). Steven Cozza and his creation of Scouting For All became
one of the central aspects to "Scout's Honor," a documentary about efforts to over-
turn the Boy Scouts' policy. See Edward Guthmann, Badge of "Honor"- Documentary
Captures Story of Steven Cozza, Who at Age 12 Took on the Boy Scouts'Anti-Gay Policy, S.F.
CHRON.,June 18, 2001, at El (explaining that documentary won multiple awards at
Sundance Film Festival).
166. See Letter from Scott Cozza, President of Scouting For All, to Roy L. Wil-
liams, Chief Scout Executive, National Headquarters Boy Scouts of America (Aug.
20, 2001) available at http://www.scoutingforall.org/aaic/resolution.shtml (last vis-
ited Nov. 14, 2001) (quoting full text of resolution). The text of Scouting For All's
resolution to Boy Scouts of America states, in pertinent part:
We ... offer the Boy Scouts of America the following resolution to allow
gay youth and adults and atheists into the Scouting program, as is the
case with most of the other Scouting Associations throughout the world.
We believe that the Boy Scouts of America must rescind its current policy
of discrimination against gay youth, and adults and atheists.
We believe that the Boy Scouts of America, pertaining to gay youth and
adults, should return to its historic standards and allow the chartering
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In August 2001, Gary Locke, Governor of the State of Washington and a
former Eagle Scout, sent a positive letter to Scouting for All applauding its
efforts to "make scouting accessible to all youth. 1' 6
7
While the efforts to change the policy are having an impact at the
local level, the Boy Scouts continue to defend its policy and are using Dale
for support. 168 In January 2001, the Boy Scouts expelled seven Boy Scout
and Cub Scout troops because their sponsoring organizations would not
(sponsoring) organization and scout units to decide their own
membership.
We believe that in allowing the chartering organization and the scout
units to decide their own membership, the Boy Scouts of America should
also establish that no person(s) shall be denied membership based on
religious belief, disability, race or sexual orientation.
We believe that the Boy Scouts of America should allow those chartering
religious organizations to continue to remain in Scouting even though
their religious doctrine may reject those persons who are gay. In cases
where youth or adults come out as gay or atheists, they should be allowed
to relocate to another scout unit that accepts diversity of the human fam-
ily. Should another scout unit not be available the scout could become a
member of the BSA Lone Scout program. With respect to adults, they
should be allowed to begin their own scout unit if another scout unit is
not available in their community,
We believe that all those who have been kicked out of the Boy Scouts of
America because of their sexual orientation and/or belief, be granted
amnesty and allowed to return as members.
CozzA, supra note 165.
167. Letter from Gary Locke, Governor, State of Washington, to Robert
Raketty, Northwest Regional Director, Scouting For All (Nov. 14, 2001), available at
http://www.scoutingforall.org/aaic/091901.shtml (last visited Sept. 26, 2001).
The pertinent part of the letter reads:
I applaud your organization's efforts to make scouting accessible to all
youth. As an Eagle Scout, I believe that scouting deeply enriches the lives
of our young people. It is a place where one enjoys camaraderie, devel-
ops leadership skills, and learn [s] the value of community service. Now
[sic] one should be denied this valuable experience.
Id. On a more negative note, Steven Cozza was ridiculed at school after he started
Scouting For All and in April 2001, received a death threat on his answering ma-
chine. See Guthmann, supra note 165, at El (reporting incident and explaining
that death threats have been problem).
168. See Boy SCOUTS OF AMERICA, AN OPEN LETTER TO AMERICA'S FAMILIES
(stating that United States Supreme Court reaffirmed Boy Scouts' fight to establish
its own membership standards), available at http://www.scouting.org/excomm/
60minutes/60minutes.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2001). The full text of the letter
reads:
We are writing to you to share some viewpoints about recent media cover-
age concerning the Boy Scouts of America.
This past June [20001, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the Boy
Scouts of America's standing as a private organization with the right to
establish its own membership and leadership standards. This historic de-
cision has strengthened our resolve to remain a beacon of values and
ideals.
Since our inception in 1910, the Boy Scouts of America has always
taught youth the traditional values of the Scout Oath and Law. These
values are consistent with the ideals embraced by most American families
and are grounded in the tenets and teaching of the majority of the
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abide by the antigay policy. 169 According to a spokesman for the Boy
Scouts, the organization will continue to expel troops that do not obey the
policy. 170 Regarding its national policy, the Boy Scouts continue to assert
that "[i]napproprate sexual behavior is inconsistent with the Scout Oath
and Law," to acknowledge that they "respect other people's rights to hold
differing opinions and [to] ask that [those people] respect [theirs] .171
world's religions. We believe an avowed homosexual is not a role model
for the values espoused in the Scout Oath and Law.
... From the beginning, Scouts are taught respect-respect for dif-
ferent ideas, customs, and cultures-and to recognize the right of individ-
uals to subscribe to other beliefs. However, respect doesn't include forced
inclusion of values, ethics, or morals that are contrary to your own.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Boy SCOUTS OF AMERICA: TRADITIONAL VALUES AND
STANDARDS (restating antigay policy), available at http://www.scouting.org/ex-
comm/60minutes/60minutes.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2001). Furthermore, the
Boy Scouts specifically asserted that, "[t] he members of the Boy Scouts of America enjoy
a First Amendment right to freedom of association and to join together to pursue shared
values, ideals, and goals. To advocate a set of standards with shared values, ideals,
and goals is an affirmative act and is not discriminatory." Boy ScouTs OF AMERICA,
BSA STANCE, available at http://www.scouting.org/excomm/60minutes/60min-
utes.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2001) (emphasis added).
169. See William Claiborne, Scouts Expel Troops Whose Leaders Oppose Gay Ban,
WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2001, at A2 (noting that troops were among first expelled
since Supreme Court case); France, supra note 139, at 50 (reporting that troops
were forced to disband after they decided to accept gays as leaders); Scout Groups
Rejected AfterFighting Gay Policy, N.Y. TIMEs,Jan. 28, 2001, § 1, at 16 (explaining that
groups were rejected because sponsors challenged exclusionary policy).
170. See Shannon Brownlee, Should You Let Your Son Join the Boy Scouts? Boy
Scouts of America's Exclusion of Homosexual Members, REDBOOK, Apr. 1, 2001, 87, 89
(reporting that, according to Boy Scouts' spokesman, any troops that disavow na-
tional policy will be expelled).
171. Boy SCOUTS OF AMERICA, TRADITIONAL VALUES AND STANDARDS, supra note
168, at Al. Specifically, regarding the loss of United Way donations, a Boy Scout
spokesman claimed that the losses have been made up by donations from other
private groups and individuals. See id. (reporting that Boy Scouts' spokesman
stated that organization remains strong and financially healthy). Scouting does
have its allies, a fact exemplified by the Boy Scouts' Pittsburgh Council receiving
an anonymous check in the amount of $1.5 million after the controversy over its
policy became public. See Brownlee, supra note 170, at 89 (reporting also that
there are signs that conservative groups are rallying around Boy Scouts to counter
pressure to change policy). According to the head of the Sam Houston Area
Council, Scouting is "'booming."' See Reinert, supra note 139, at Al (noting that
same council recently raised $18 million for new camp and had annual budget
approximately $900,000 larger than previous year). According to one report, in a
recent poll, seventy-five percent of Americans had a favorable view toward the Boy
Scouts. See Ferrara, supra note 139, at 22 (reporting also that eleven percent had
unfavorable view toward Boy Scouts). Regarding membership numbers, the Boy
Scouts has approximately 6.2 million boys, twenty-percent higher than in 1990. See
id. (reporting recent membership numbers and relation to past numbers). One
report, however, claims that, according to internal documents, membership in
Cub and Boy Scouts in 2001 dropped 4.5% from 2000 and that in the Northeast
region membership was down 7.8%. See France, supra note 139, at 47 (reporting
internal documents showing membership decline).
20021 NOTE
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B. Impact on Homosexual Americans
At first glance, the Court's decision in Dale may be viewed as a direct
assault on gay rights. 17 2 Regarding homosexual individuals this may be
true.17 3 Regarding the rights of gay activist groups, however, the decision
in Dale may become a victory, albeit one in disguise. 174 This section there-
fore separately considers the impact on homosexual individuals and gay
rights advocacy groups. 175
1. Impact on Homosexual Individuals
Reading the majority's opinion, along with the Boy Scouts' argu-
ments, it seems that Dale's exclusion was based on, and justified by, his
"coming out" and becoming an avowed homosexual, rather than his status
as a homosexual individual. 176 By so viewing Dale, the majority of the
Court clearly looked to Dale's coming out as sending a message, contrary
to that of the Boy Scouts, that homosexuality is not immoral.' 77 While the
172. See Bernstein, Expressive Association, supra note 13, at 620 (explaining that
Dale is opposed by some because it "seems to deal a blow to gay rights").
173. For a further discussion of the impact that Dale may have on homosexual
individuals, see infra notes 176-85 and accompanying text.
174. For a further discussion of the impact that Dale may have on gay rights
advocacy groups, see infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
175. For a further discussion of the impact that Dale may have on homosexual
individuals, see infra notes 176-85 and accompanying text. For a further discussion
of the impact that Dale may have on gay rights advocacy groups, see infra notes 186-
90 and accompanying text.
176. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000) (emphasizing
that Dale became leader in gay community and was honest about his sexual orien-
tation). In fact, in its brief to the United States Supreme Court, the Boy Scouts
argued that:
Boy Scouting makes no effort to discover the sexual orientation of any
person. Its expressive purpose is not implicated unless a prospective
leader presents himself as a role model inconsistent with Boy Scouting's
understanding of the Scout Oath and Law. Boy Scouting does not have an
"anti-gay" policy, it has a morally straight policy.
Brief for Petitioner at 6, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-
699) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Boy Scouts argued that Dale would use
his Scoutmaster position as a "bully pulpit" to "communicate 'how bad or wrong'
Boy Scouting's policy is." Id. at 21-22.
177. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 653 (finding that Dale's presence in Boy Scouts
would "send a message" that Boy Scouts accepts homosexual behavior). The argu-
ment that an openly gay individual sends a message that homosexuality is not im-
moral finds support even among the gay community. Cf Knauer, supra note 30, at
1060 (noting that "pro-gay... organizations agree that the openly gay individual
sends a message of gay pride"). It also finds support among scholars, one of whom
has suggested that, "[iun the Boy Scouts, 'I'm gay' sends a message about the
speaker's views regarding the morality of homosexuality and contradicts the Boy
Scouts' own expressive message." Id. at 1045. The same scholar notes that "[i]n
reality, a public avowal of homosexuality signals a propensity for sodomy and sug-
gests that the speaker, in light of his openness, does not consider homosexuality to
be immoral or shameful." Id. Finally, the same scholar argues that publicly avow-
ing that one is a homosexual "will not simply be a statement of identity until ...
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Court's holding may have been correct based on the facts of Dale, the
Court's reasoning may have negative social repercussions, especially for
homosexual individuals.
178
Similar to religious beliefs, and unlike other personal characteristics
such as sex, race and ethnicity, a person's sexual orientation is not readily
apparent. 179 Because of this, a person's sexual orientation only becomes
identifiable when the person voluntarily, or in some cases involuntarily,
exposes it.' 80 Therefore, to a homosexual individual, "coming out is a
necessary prerequisite to claiming identity as a homosexual citizen." 18 1
The danger of the majority's reasoning in Dale is that if homosexuals
are aware that their coming out is not viewed as part of their identity or
status, but rather as a message that can cause them to be excluded from
certain groups or accommodations, they may be tempted to hide their
identity. 18 2 This fear of coming out has clear negative consequences to
the individual's self-esteem, well-being and emotional adjustment.' 83 Fur-
thermore, and equally important, there are negative social consequences,
such as societal misunderstanding of, or even anger toward, homosexu-
als.' 8 4 As one scholar has correctly argued, "[s]omething culturally good
is lost when fine people live in such fear of nonconformity, and something
culturally dangerous is instantiated if the majority's values become univer-
sal by force rather than persuasion." 185
the mainstream political discourse no longer debates the legitimacy of homosexual
subjects, relationships, and identities." Id.
178. For a further discussion of the impact that Dale may have on homosexual
individuals, see infra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
179. See Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After
Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1515, 1551 (2001) (noting that, unlike
skin color, homosexuality is not observable); Eskridge, supra note 30, at 2418 (ex-
plaining that, unlike sex, race, and ethnicity "[a]t the most superficial level, relig-
ion and sexual orientation are usually not apparent to casual observation . . .").
180. See Eskridge, supra note 30, at 2419 (explaining that sexual orientation is
only revealed by person's speech or sexual conduct).
181. Knauer, supra note 30, at 1035.
182. Cf Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness: Hurley, Free
Speech, and Gay and Lesbian Equality, 1 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 85, 120 (1998) (noting
that for homosexual individuals, closet may serve as insulation from "direct dis-
crimination, violence, and emotional abuse . . .").
183. See id. at 121 ("Perhaps the greatest negative effect the closet has on
individual gays and lesbians is to their emotional and psychological well-being.").
As at least one scholar has noted, one of the most potent consequences of remain-
ing in the closet is the exceedingly high suicide rates for gay and bisexual teenag-
ers. See Eskridge, supra note 30, at 2444 (explaining that suicide rates illustrate
"suffocating effects of the closet").
184. See Eskridge, supra note 30, at 2443-47 (discussing social costs of sup-
pressing identity speech).
185. Id. at 2445.
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2. Impact on Gay Rights Groups
While Dale may have a negative impact on the rights of homosexuals
as individuals, Dale may become a victory for the advocacy of gay rights
through gay rights groups and organizations. 18 6 Just as openly identifying
oneself as a homosexual is important to the personal development of the
homosexual individual, finding a safe place to discuss that self-identifica-
tion is equally important. 18 7 As at least two scholars have noted, "'from
the beginnings of the gay civil rights movement, gay organizations have
relied on exclusively gay environments in which to feel safe, to build rela-
tionships, and to develop political strategy .... Even groups that are not
exclusively gay would resist having heterosexuals in leadership posi-
tions."' 188 It is not surprising, therefore, that Gays and Lesbians for Indi-
vidual Liberty, an organization promoting societal tolerance and
acceptance of homosexuals, filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the
Boy Scouts. 189 Following the holding in Dale, gay advocacy groups, like
other groups seeking uniform membership and leadership, can feel safe
that government intervention with their membership and/or leadership
criteria will not be tolerated. 190
V. CONCLUSION
Reading Dale narrowly, the result is overtly clear: the Boy Scouts of
America cannot be forced to include avowed homosexuals among its
members.19 1 Reading Dale broadly and in the long term, however, the
186. See Steffen N. Johnson, Expressive Association and Organizational Autonomy,
85 MINN. L. REV. 1639, 1667 (2001) (explaining that Dale may be viewed as victory
to gay organizations).
187. See id. (explaining importance for some gay groups to limit membership
and leadership to persons with similar backgrounds and beliefs).
188. Id. (quoting Carpenter, supra note 179, at 1550) (alteration in original).
189. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of Gays and Lesbians for Individual Lib-
erty in Support of Petitioners, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No.
99-699) (arguing in Boy Scouts' favor to reverse decision of New Jersey Supreme
Court). Specifically, the organization argued that denying the Boy Scouts the right
to express its views through membership selection "endangers the rights of all
Americans, including gay Americans." Id. at 3 (emphasis added). Arguing generally
for the preservation of expressive association, Gays and Lesbians for Individual
Liberty asserted that, "[a]s majority opinion often disfavors gay establishments, it is
vital to preserve freedom of association so that local governments will not attempt
to use their power to discourage gays from congregating." Id. at 11.
190. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) ("The forced
inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group's freedom of ex-
pressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the
group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints."); id. (finding government
actions that intrude on organization's structure or affairs unconstitutional).
191. For a further discussion of the facts of Dale and the majority's holding
and reasoning, see supra notes 53-113 and accompanying text.
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real victor remains to be seen. 19 2 While the Boy Scouts achieved a clear
victory in the Supreme Court, it may experience a different fate in the
court of public opinion. 19
3
Daniel E. McGuire
192. For a further discussion of the impact that Dale may have on the Boy
Scouts of America, homosexual individuals and advocacy groups, see supra notes
138-90 and accompanying text.
193. For a further discussion of Dale's impact on how the Boy Scouts' policy is
viewed in the court of public opinion and within the Boy Scouts itself, see supra
notes 138-71 and accompanying text.
35
McGuire: The Supreme Court's Latest Resolution of the Conflict between Fre
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47: p. 387
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss2/3
